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Winston v. Commonwealth
604 S.E.2d 21 (Va. 2004)
L Facts
In June 2003 a jury found Leon Jermain Winston guilty of three counts of
capital murder, two counts of attempted robbery and statutory burglary, one
count of maliciously discharging a firearm, and five counts of using a firearm
while committing a felony.' All of the charges resulted from the murders of
Anthony and Rhonda Robinson on April 19,2002.2 Witnesses and crime scene
evidence presented at trial revealed that Winston and Kevin Brown broke into
the Robinsons' house and shot and killed them both while the Robinsons' eight
and five-year-old daughters were in the house.3 In a separate sentencing phase,
the jury found both the vileness and future dangerousness aggravators and
imposed three death sentences.4 On appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia,
Winston alleged numerous trial errors.'
II. Holding
The Supreme Court of Virginia found no error and affirmed Winston's
three death sentences.6 Specifically, the court determined that the trial court did
not err when it denied Winston's request for an expert under Ake v. Oklahoma,7
permitted testimony regarding the fact that one of the victims was pregnant at
1. Winston v. Commonwealth, 604 S.E.2d 21, 28 (Va. 2004); see VA. CODE ANN. 5 18.2-31
(Michie 2004) (defining capital murder). The three capital murder convictions were for "the capital
murder of Anthony Robinson in the commission of robbery or attempted robbery ... capital
murder of Rhonda Robinson in the commission of robbery or attempted robbery... [and] capital
murder of Rhonda Robinson during the same transaction in which another person was willfully,
deliberately, and with premeditation killed." Winston, 604 S.E.2d at 28.
2. Winston, 604 S.E.2d at 26-28.
3. Id. at 26-27.
4. Id. at 28; see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2004) (listing the aggravating factors
a jury must find in order to impose death).
5. Winston, 604 S.E.2d at 29; see VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-313 (Michie 2004) (requiring
automatic review of any death sentence by the Supreme Court of Virginia). Of the seventy-two
assignments of error, the court immediately dismissed fifteen because Winston did not brief them.
Winston, 604 S.E.2d at 29. Further, the court dismissed nine of Winston's assignments because the
court found "no reason to modify our previously expressed views on these questions." Id. at 29-30.
Various issues that involved the appointment of experts, the seating of jurors, admitted evidence,
jury instructions, the sentencing phase, and the postsentencing phase will not be addressed in this
case note. Seegeneral# id. at 26-55 (finding no error in the trial court's judgment).
6. Winston, 604 S.E.2d at 54-55.
7. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
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the time she was murdered, and allowed a police officer and other witness to
testify regarding Winston's attempt to elude the police at the time of a prior,
relatively minor offense.8 Further, the court rejected Winston's argument that
the absence of mental retardation is an element of a capital offense that the
Commonwealth must affirmatively prove beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.9
III. Analsis
A. Expert Funding Under Ake
First, Winston argued that the trial court erred when it appointed Winston
a mental health expert pursuant to Virginia Code section 19.2-264.3:1, rather than
under the federal due process rule of Ake."0 Winston had requested the mental
health expert pursuant to Ake, as opposed to section 19.2-264.3:1, and argued
that he had an independent constitutional right to such a mental health expert."
The court presumed that Winston made the request to avoid the notice and
discovery requirements of section 19.2-264.3:1.12 Ake requires the state to
provide a mental health expert to the indigent defendant when the defendant's
sanity at the time of the offense is "likely to be a significant factor in his defense"
or the State plans to proffer psychiatric testimony in support of future danger-
ousness during sentencing. 3 The Supreme Court of Virginia determined that the
trial court fulfilled the Ake requirements when it furnished Winston with a
mental health expert pursuant to section 19.2-264.3:1.1' The court noted that
Winston never demonstrated that his sanity at the time of the offense would be
8. Winston, 604 S.E.2d at 33-34, 38-40, 51-52; see Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83-84
(1985) (holding that due process requires the state to provide a defendant with the means to at least
one competent mental health expert when the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense is at
issue or the prosecution plans to introduce psychiatric testimony regarding future dangerousness).
9. Winston, 604 S.E.2d at 50-51; see Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002) (noting that
any fact that increases the defendant's authorized punishment must be proven to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt).
10. Winston, 604 S.E.2d at 33.
11. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (Michie 2004) (requiring trial courts to supply
capital defendants with a mental health expert upon a showing of financial need); Ake, 470 U.S. at
83-84 (holding that under certain circumstances due process requires the state to provide a
defendant with the means to at least one competent mental health expert). Seegeneral Mark J.
Goldsmith, Ask and the Commonwealth Shall Receive: The Imbalance of Viginia's Mental-Health Expert
Statute, 17 CAP. DEF.J. 293 (2005) (discussing possible constitutional challenges to Virginia Code
section 19.2-264.3:1).
12. Winston, 604 S.E.2d at 33; see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1(D) (requiring the defense
to give the prosecution "the report and the results of any other evaluation of the defendant's mental
condition conducted relative to the sentencing proceeding and copies of psychiatric, psychological,
medical or other records obtained during the course of such evaluation" once the defense an-
nounces that it will introduce psychiatric or psychological evidence during sentencing).
13. Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83.
14. Winston, 604 S.E.2d at 34.
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a factor and that the prosecution had not planned to introduce psychiatric test-
imony regarding Winston's future dangerousness; thus, Winston did not trigger
Ake's requirements. 5 The court also added that Winston presented no psychiat-
ric testimony at trial, and therefore, the notice provisions of section 19.2-
264.3:1(D) were not at issue.'
6
B. Admission of Evidence of Victim's Pregnangy
Next, Winston argued "that any mention of Rhonda's pregnancy at trial was
irrelevant and, assuming that Rhonda's pregnancy ha[d] any relevance, its proba-
tive value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect on the jury."' 7 The trial court
granted Winston's motion to prohibit the prosecution from mentioning the
victim's pregnancy during voir dire. 8 The trial court, however, "reserv[ed] ruling
on the admissibility of that fact at trial."' 9 Subsequently, the trial court permitted
the prosecution to introduce evidence of the victim's pregnancy if one of the
Commonwealth's witnesses, Nathan Rorls, included it in his description of what
Winston had told him about the murder.2" Rorls did not mention the pregnancy
on direct examination."' However, when the Commonwealth tried to rehabilitate
Rorls after the defense attempted to impeach him, Rorls testified that Winston
told him the victim was pregnant at the time of the murder.' The Common-
wealth then recalled the medical examiner who confirmed the victim's
pregnancy.2 3 Despite the defendant's objection, the court admitted the medical
examiner's testimony because evidence of the victim's pregnancy was "already
in.,,4 The Commonwealth also mentioned the victim's pregnancy during its
closing statement in order to re-enforce Rorls's credibility.2 5
For "evidence to be relevant, it must have a 'logical tendency, however
slight, to prove a fact at issue in the case.' ,,6 The Supreme Court of Virginia
noted that although the pregnancy evidence may not have been relevant prior to
15. Id.; see also Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920,925 (Va. 1996) (finding thatAke's
holding extends to any expert when the defendant can show that such assistance is " 'likely to be
a significant factor in his defense'" (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83)).
16. Winston, 604 S.E.2d at 34.
17. Id. at 39.




22. Winston, 604 S.E.2d at 38-39.
23. Id. at 39.
24. Id. The re-examination of the medical examiner only consisted of the Commonwealth
asking whether the victim was pregnant and the examiner answering "yes." Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. (quoting Clay v. Commonwealth, 546 S.E.2d 728, 730 (Va. 2001))..
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Rorls's testimony, the evidence became relevant when the defendant questioned
Rorls's credibility.2 7 The victim's pregnancy tended to confirm Rorls's testimony
that he received all his information from Winston and thereby rebutted the
defense's assertion that Rorls received his information from others. 8
The court then considered whether the evidence's probative value out-
weighed its prejudicial value.29 The defense argued that the evidence of the
victim's pregnancy was inflammatory and outweighed its probative value.3 ° The
court noted that "evidence of pregnancy is not inadmissibleper se, its prejudicial
effect must be weighed against its probative value."' 3' The court determined that
the evidence's probative value was high due to the importance of Rors's credibil-
ity, while its prejudicial impact was diminished because the Commonwealth did
not sensationalize the evidence and only introduced it to rehabilitate a key
witness." Thus, the court concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting
the evidence concerning the victim's pregnancy.
33
C. Mental Retardation as an Element of the Crime or Aggravating Circumstance
Further, Winston asserted that Atkins v. Virginia 4 and sections 19.2-
264.3:1.1 and 19.2-264.3:1.2 turned the absence of mental retardation into an
element of capital murder that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reason-
able doubt.3" Winston also alleged that sections 19.2-264.3:1.1 and 19.2-264.3:1.2
were promulgated after Winston committed the murders and that the statutes
could not "be applied retroactively under the ex post facto, due process, and
equal protection clauses of the U.S. and Virginia Constitutions" because they
added a new element to the offense of capital murder.3 6 The court agreed with
the Supreme Court of Louisiana in State v. Williams,3 7 which determined that
27. Id.
28. Winston, 604 S.E.2d at 39.
29. Id. at 39-40.
30. Id. at 38.
31. Id. at 40.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
35. Winston, 604 S.E.2d at 50-51; see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 (Michie 2004)
(establishing procedures for determining whether a capital defendant is mentally retarded); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.2 (Michie 2004) (establishing procedures for a capital defendant to
obtain expert assistance to assess possible mental retardation); Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (holding that
due process requires that a jury determine aggravating factors that render a defendant eligible for
the death penalty); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits the execution of mentally retarded persons).
36. Winston, 604 S.E.2d at 50.
37. 831 So. 2d 835 (La. 2002).
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" 'Atkins explicitly addressed mental retardation as an exemption from capital
punishment' " and not as an aggravator or an element of capital murder.
38
Accordingly, the court rejected each of Winston's claims and concluded that
Atkins did not create a new aggravator or element of capital murder; rather,
Atkins only created "an affirmative defense to the imposition of the death pen-
alty."
39
D. Admission of Recordfor Eluding Police Officer
Winston also alleged that the trial court erred when it permitted testimony
about the details of Winston's arrest for eluding a police officer.' During the
sentencing phase, both a police officer involved in the pursuit and Winston's
passenger during the chase testified about the dangerous police chase that ended
when Winston was arrested with a gun in his lap just after telling his passenger
that "he had to go take care of some business."'" Winston argued that the
testimony was inflammatory and cumulative because the jury already knew about
the charge from the sentencing order.42 The court noted that it had" 'repeatedly
approved the use of testimonial evidence relating to a defendant's commission
of other crimes of which he has been convicted.' "3 The evidence was relevant
to future dangerousness because it tended to show that Winston had "a general
disregard for human life" and "a history of violent or dangerous behavior.""
Without discussing the prejudicial nature of the evidence, the court concluded
that the trial court did not err in admitting either witness's testimony.
4s
IV. Application to Viginia Practice
A. Ake Issues
Subsection D of section 19.2-264.3:1 requires the defense to disclose almost
all court-appointed mental-health expert findings to the prosecution and to
submit to a mental-health evaluation, if the defense intends to introduce psychiat-
ric testimony at trial.' The court in Winston rejected the defendant's argument
38. Winston, 604 S.E.2d at 50-51 (quoting State v. Williams, 831 So. 2d 835, 860 n.35 (La.
2002)).
39. Id. at 50.
40. Id. at 51.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting Watkins v. Commonwealth, 331 S.E.2d 422, 436 (Va. 1985)).
44. Winston, 604 S.E.2d at 51.
45. Id. at 52.
46. See VA.CODEANN. § 19.2-264.3:1(D) (Michie 2004) (providing that the defense shall give
the prosecution all mental health evaluations if the defendant announces its intention to proffer
psychiatric or psychological testimony at sentencing).
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that Ake creates a right to expert assistance independent of the right under
Virginia Code section 19.2-264.3:1. 47 Thus, a defendant may not use Ake to
evade the notice requirements attached to the appointment of a section 19.2-
264.3:1 expert. However, the Supreme Court of Virginia in Husske v. Common-
wealth48 recognized that Ake applies to any type of expert if the defendant shows
that the expert " 'is likely to be a significant factor in his defense.' ),49 Virginia
Code section 19.2-264.3:1 only applies to capital defendants seeking mental
health experts."0 Thus, there is still an independent right under Ake and Husske
to funding for non-mental health experts.5 '
B. Mental Retardation as an Element of Capital Murder or an Aggravating Circumstance
Winston clarified that the Supreme Court of Virginia does not consider the
absence of mental retardation to be an element of capital murder or an additional
aggravating factor.5" Rather, mental retardation is an affirmative defense to the
imposition of the death penalty.5 3 The Supreme Court of Virginia's holding is
not unique; other jurisdictions have determined that the absence of mental
retardation is not an element of capital murder or an aggravating factor that the
State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.54 Although some state courts have
accepted the proposition that defendants are entitled to a jury determination of
mental retardation, the proposition that the State must bear the burden of proof
has not fared as well.55 Thus, capital defendants in Virginia must prove that they
47. Winston, 604 S.E.2d at 33-34.
48. 476 S.E.2d 920 (Va. 1996).
49. Husske, 476 S.E.2d at 925 (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 83).
50. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (giving capital defendants access to a mental health
expert upon a showing of financial need).
51. See Husske, 476 S.E.2d at 925 (finding that the state must provide defendants with an
expert upon a showing that the expert is likely to be a significant factor in the defense and that the
expert's absence will prejudice the defendant).
52. Winston, 604 S.E.2d at 50-51.
53. Id. at 50.
54. See In reJohnson, 334 F.3d 403,404-05 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding that Atkins did not turn
the absence of mental retardation into an element of a capital crime such that the State must prove
it beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury); Walton v.Johnson, 269 F. Supp. 2d 692,698 n.3 (W.D. Va.
2003) (finding that the absence of mental retardation is not an element of capital murder because
it does not increase the maximum possible penalty for the crime); Head v. Hill, 587 S.E.2d 613,
619-20 (Ga. 2003) (same); Wiili'ams, 831 So. 2d at 860 n.35 (same); ExParte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d
1, 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (same).
55. See, e.g., Murphy v. State, 54 P.3d 556, 568 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (finding that the jury




are mentally retarded by a preponderance of the evidence, and the jury will make
that determination only if the guilt phase was tried before a jury.
5 6
Yet the court's explanation for rejecting Winston's claims involving mental
retardation was not completely satisfying. To support its conclusion that the
absence of mental retardation is not an element of a capital offense and at least
implicitly to support its conclusion that absence of mental retardation is not an
aggravating factor, the court observed that "an accused can be found guilty of a
capital offense and not receive the death penalty."57 However, the court misun-
derstood the defendant's argument: the issue was whether the absence of mental
retardation was a necessary predicate for a death sentence, not whether the jury
was required to impose death after finding that the defendant did not have
mental retardation. In concluding that a jury must find beyond a reasonable
doubt the existence of aggravating circumstances necessary to sentence a defen-
dant to death, the Court in Ring v. AriZona58 noted that " '[a]ll the facts which
must exist in order to subject the defendant to a legally prescribed punishment
mustbe found by the jury."'5 9 Like the elements of capital murder or aggravating
circumstances, the judge or jury must find that the defendant is not mentally
retarded in order to impose the death penalty.6" The court failed to address this
part of the defendant's argument.
C Evidentiay Issues
In permitting the Commonwealth to introduce the police officer's and
witness's accounts of Winston's elusion of police officers, the court noted that
"'[in determining his proclivity for violence, the jury may obtain from the mere
record of previous convictions an inaccurate or incomplete impression of the
defendant's temperament and disposition. "'61 This holding was consistent with
Stamperv. Commonwealth,62 in which the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld admis-
sion of a witness's testimony whom the defendant had shot in an unrelated crime
because the evidence demonstrated that the defendant had "such a propensity to
56. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 (C) (Michie 2004) ("The defendant shall bear the
burden of proving that he is mentally retarded by a preponderance of the evidence.").
57. Winston, 604 S.E.2d at 50.
58. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
59. Ring, 536 U.S. at 602 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 499 (2000) (Scalia,
J., concurring)); see Appirn, 530 U.S. at 490 ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.').
60. SeeAtkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution
of the mentally retarded).
61. Winston, 604 S.E.2d at 51-52 (quoting Stamper v. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 808, 819
(Va. 1979)).
62. 257 S.E.2d 808 (Va. 1979).
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violence as to make him a menace to society."63 The defendant's gunshot had
impaired the witness's ability to walk and speak." The court, however, admitted
it because the testimony and the record of the past crime distinguished Stamper
from other defendants who had committed similar crimes.65 Thus, defense
counsel should be aware that courts will admit extremely inflammatory evidence
of the defendant's past acts in order to prove future dangerousness.
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Virginia determined that evidence of the
victim's pregnancy was relevant because it contributed to Rorls's credibility.66
Although it did not rule on the issue, the court indicated that the evidence may
not have been relevant had the defense not questioned Rorls's credibility on
cross-examination." Further, the court determined that the inflammatory nature
of a murder victim's pregnancy does not make evidence concerning it per se
inadmissible; rather, courts must evaluate such evidence for its prejudicial and
probative value.68 In balancing prejudicial and probative value, the court empha-
sized that the Commonwealth introduced the evidence out of necessity to protect
the credibility of its star witness and did not present the evidence in an inflamma-
tory matter.69 Courts in other jurisdictions have also focused on the manner in
which the prosecution used evidence of the victim's pregnancy to assess whether
its admission required reversal.7" The defense must fight to keep such inflamma-
tory evidence out at trial because a reviewing court is unlikely to overturn its
admission unless the prosecution unduly exploits it, or it is clearly not material
to the State's case.
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court of Virginia denied Winston's claims and affirmed the
trial court's holding.7 Specifically, the court determined that capital defendants
63. Stamper, 257 S.E.2d at 819.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Winston, 604 S.E.2d at 39.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 39-40.
69. Id. at 40.
70. See People v. Lewis, 651 N.E.2d 72, 83-85 (Ill. 1995) (noting that the manner in which
the State raised evidence of the victim's pregnancyis relevant to determining whether the evidence's
probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect); State v. Moore, 585 A.2d 864, 887 (N.J. 1991)
("The liberty of the repeated references to defendant's 'pregnant wife,' without corresponding
establishment of relevance to defendant's state of mind with respect to either victim or to any
defense, tended in effect to outweigh probative value with undue prejudice."); People v. Martinez,
734 P.2d 650, 652 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that although evidence of the victim's pregnancy
was irrelevant, the prosecution's two brief references to the evidence did not prejudice the defen-
dant).
71. Winston, 604 S.E.2d at 54-55.
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seeking a mental health expert have no independent right to an expert under Ake
and that Virginia Code section 19.2-264.3:1 satisfies Ake.7 2 Further, the court
concluded that the trial court did not err by admitting testimony regarding the
victim's pregnancy at the time of the murder or the defendant's attempt to evade
the police.7 3 Finally, the court rejected the defendant's claim that Atkins and
Virginia Code sections 19.2-264.3:1.1 and 19.2-264.3:1.2 turned the absence of
mental retardation into an element of capital murder or an aggravating factor and





Id. at 38-40, 51-52.
Id. at 50-51.
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